Analysis of Georgia's Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund Reserves by Edward Sennoga
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS OF GEORGIA’S 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE TRUST FUND 
RESERVES 
 
Edward Sennoga 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fiscal Research Center 
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies 
Georgia State University 
Atlanta, GA 
 
FRC Report No. 123 
March 2006 
 
Analysis of Georgia’s Unemployment Insurance 
Trust Fund Reserves 
 
 
 ii
Acknowledgments 
 
I would like to thank Kenneth Heaghney, Sally Wallace, and David Sjoquist 
for helpful comments and suggestions. I am also grateful to Mr. John Lawrence of the 
Georgia Department of Labor for providing us with the Unemployment Insurance 
Trust Fund data used in this report. All errors remain my own. 
 
Analysis of Georgia’s Unemployment Insurance 
Trust Fund Reserves 
 
 
 iii
Table of Contents 
 
Acknowledgments.........................................................................................................ii 
 
Executive Summary ..................................................................................................... iv 
 
I. Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1 
 
II. Institution Background ..................................................................................... 2 
  1. Purpose of the Trust Fund.................................................................... 2 
  2. Financing the UI Trust Fund................................................................ 3 
  3. UI Benefits ........................................................................................... 6 
  4. Georgia’s Trust Fund Size and UI Tax Rates ...................................... 7 
 
III. Structure of Georgia’s Trust Fund.................................................................... 9 
  1. History of Trust Fund Balance............................................................. 9 
  2. Surcharges and Rate Reductions........................................................ 10 
  3. Solvency Measures ............................................................................ 11 
 
IV. Trust Fund and the Business Cycle ................................................................ 16 
  1. Trust Fund Performance over the Business Cycle ............................. 16 
  2. Stress Testing of Alternative Measures of Solvency ......................... 18 
 
V. Unemployment Insurance Tax Cuts ............................................................... 21 
 
VI. Conclusions .................................................................................................... 23 
 
References................................................................................................................... 24 
 
Analysis of Georgia’s Unemployment Insurance 
Trust Fund Reserves 
 
 
 iv
Executive Summary 
 
Purpose of the Trust Fund 
The uneven distribution of the risk of unemployment implies that a market for 
Unemployment Insurance (UI) would not form naturally in the private sector, since 
workers with a lower risk of becoming temporarily unemployed would form their 
own pool so as to pay lower insurance premiums. Therefore, if UI was voluntary, 
workers facing a higher risk of temporary unemployment, especially in volatile 
industries like manufacturing and construction, would face prohibitively high 
premiums. 
This implies therefore that federal and state governments need to partially 
subsidize the premiums of high-risk workers. A payroll tax collected from employers 
ensures coverage of both high and relatively low-risk employees.  
The federal-state system of UI in the United States was established by the 
provisions of the Social Security Act of 1935 to provide partial wage replacement for 
involuntarily unemployed workers, to reduce the dispersal of skilled workers when 
employers make temporary layoffs, to help maintain aggregate purchasing power 
during economic downturns, and to prevent the breakdown of general labor standards 
during such periods.  
 
Financing the UI Trust Fund 
Georgia’s UI is financed entirely by payroll taxes statutorily levied on 
employers. Unlike in the states of Alaska, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania which 
collect employee contributions, employees in Georgia do not contribute to the Trust 
Fund. 
UI taxes have both a federal and state component. Since Georgia’s 
unemployment compensation program has been approved by the federal government 
and continues to adhere to federal guidelines, the federal tax is, in effect, 0.8 percent 
of the first $7,000 of wages, or an equivalent of $56 per covered worker each year.  
Proceeds from the federal government UI tax are used to pay administrative 
costs of the program at both the federal and state levels, to partially cover the cost of 
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extended benefits, and to maintain a federal unemployment Trust Fund which a state 
may borrow from should it exhaust its own Trust Fund. Federal government UI taxes 
are typically not used to pay benefits. 
Federal loans come at a cost to employers as additional federal UI taxes are 
imposed on employers whose states have borrowed from the federal UI Trust Fund. 
Federal rules dictate that interest payments on federal loans can only be financed by 
UI surcharges or general revenues and not paid out of Trust Fund balances. 
Georgia’s UI taxable wage base is the first $8,500 of earnings for each 
employee each year, paid by all liable employers or employers subject to the 
Employment Security Law. Wages over $8,500 are considered non-taxable for UI 
purposes in the state of Georgia.  
Tax rates are based on the “experience rating principle.” This principle 
considers the history of an employer’s UI benefits paid to former workers, the growth 
of an employer’s payroll, and the overall unemployment conditions for the state. The 
experience rating principle requires that an employer’s tax rate vary positively with 
its propensity to lay off workers, suggesting that each employer is subject to a 
different rate. 
The minimum and maximum UI rates in Georgia for 2005 were 0.03 percent 
and 6.48 percent, respectively. The maximum UI tax rate for 2006 is 6.21 percent 
while the minimum rate is unchanged at 0.03 percent. 
Revenues from the state UI taxes are deposited in the UI Trust Fund managed 
by the U.S. Treasury. The U.S. Treasury pays approximately 7 percent in interest on 
the accounts and states draw down the Trust Fund to pay benefits and refund 
overpayments to employers. 
The UI Trust Fund is used exclusively to finance the payment of regular 
benefits which comprise the biggest proportion of total UI costs. Federal loans to the 
state must eventually be repaid with interest, and as such, Georgia’s UI system is 
essentially self-financed by its employers. 
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UI Benefits 
UI provides unemployment benefits to eligible workers who are unemployed 
through no fault of their own and who are either looking for another job, have definite 
recall to their jobs within 6 weeks of the last day worked, or are in approved training. 
Eligibility for benefits is determined based on past wages, reason for job separation, 
and availability and job search requirements.  
The weekly benefit amount (WBA) of benefits a claimant may receive is the 
whole dollar amount which is computed by dividing the two highest base period 
quarters (or the first four of the last five completed calendar quarters at the time of 
filing) by 46.  
The number of weeks of entitlement ranges from a minimum of nine weeks to 
a maximum of 26 weeks. The total maximum benefits to which a claimant is entitled 
during the benefit year (365 days forward from the date the claim is filed) is one-
fourth of the total base period wages or 26 times the weekly benefit amount, 
whichever is less.  
The extended benefit program provides up to 13 weeks of additional benefits 
or “extended benefits” to workers who have exhausted their regular UI benefits 
especially in times of high unemployment. 
The state of Georgia is reimbursed by the federal government for 50 percent 
of all but the first week of extended benefits, implying that there is a charge of 100 
percent to Georgia employers for the first week of these benefits. Governmental 
agencies are charged 100 percent of all weeks paid with extended benefits. 
 
Structure of Georgia’s UI Trust Fund 
Georgia’s Trust Fund balance has grown steadily over the past 30 years 
(1970-1999), with only minor drawdown cycles during the periods 1974-1976, 1981-
1982, and 1990-1992. The onset of the new millennium saw a marked drawdown in 
Georgia’s Trust Fund reserves which lasted for four years starting in 2000 through 
2003.  
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The duration and percentage decrease of the early 2000 drawdown cycle far 
exceeds any other drawdown cycle in the 35 year history (1970-2004). The 
drawdown during the period 2000-2004, is among other things, considered to be a 
result of a 1999 moratorium by the state’s legislature providing for the temporary 
suspension of employer contributions to the Trust Fund. 
Georgia’s UI structure is designed to ensure solvency of the Trust Fund while 
minimizing the UI payroll tax burden on the state’s employers via surcharges on 
covered employers when the reserve ratio falls below 1 percent and rate reductions 
when the reserve ratio gains by over 2.44 percent. According to this criterion, it 
appears that the rate reduction provision only applied prior to 1975 when the reserve 
ratio exceeded the 2.44 percent mark, while surcharges should have been imposed 
after 2002 when the reserve ratio fell short of the 1 percent threshold.   
 
Solvency of Georgia’s UI Trust Fund 
The solvency of Georgia’s UI Trust Fund is evaluated by three widely used 
measures of assessing UI Trust Fund adequacy: the average high cost multiple 
(AHCM), high cost multiple (HCM), and the reserve ratio. We compute the second 
highest cost multiple or 2HCM for comparison purposes. 
The AHCM, computes adequate reserves to finance at least 12 months of 
benefits paid out at the average of the state’s three highest “cost rates” (statewide 
ratio of benefits paid out of total wages of UI eligible employees in any calendar 
year) over the previous 20 years.  For comparison purposes, we also compute the 
AHCM over the past 35 years.  
Our findings reveal that Georgia’s AHCM is 119 which falls short of the U.S. 
Labor Department (U.S. DOL) endorsed AHCM of 150.  The U.S. DOL standard 
requires Trust Fund reserves sufficient to finance 18 months of benefits paid out at 
the average of the three highest cost rates recorded during the past 20 years.  
Georgia’s AHCM reveals that the state has sufficient reserves to finance 14 
months of benefits paid out at the average of the three highest cost rates recorded 
during the past 20 years. When the period of analysis is extend to 35 years, our 
results indicate that Georgia’s Trust Fund reserves are only sufficient to finance 11 
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months of benefits paid out at the average of the three highest cost rates recorded 
during the past 35 years. 
The high cost multiple (HCM) measure computes Trust Fund reserves 
sufficient to finance 12 months of benefits paid out at the highest cost rate recorded 
during the previous 20 years. According to the HCM standard, Georgia Trust Fund 
reserves are sufficient to finance approximately 9 months of benefits paid out at the 
highest cost rate recorded during the past 20 years. 
A variant of the HCM measure, the second highest cost multiple or 2HCM, 
calculates adequate Trust Fund reserves to finance 12 months of benefits paid out at 
the second highest cost rate recorded during the previous 20 years. Georgia’s 2HCM 
of 118 indicates that the state has sufficient reserves to finance 14 months of benefits 
paid out at the average of the second highest cost rate recorded during the past 20 
years. 
The reserve ratio measure on the other hand is a ratio of Trust Fund balances 
to total wages and is the highest possible threshold of solvency. The reserve ratio 
assesses Trust Fund reserves relative to full wage insurance. Our findings show that 
Georgia’s reserve ratio was 0.6 percent by the end of 2004, indicating that the state’s 
Trust Fund reserves could replace 0.6 percent of all wages. Most UI solvency experts 
feel that a pre-recession reserve ratio of at least 2.0 is ideal. 
 
Major Conclusions 
The structure of Georgia’s Trust Fund is similar to other states in some 
aspects including the determination of UI tax rates using the experience rating 
principle while differences encompass the financial health of Georgia’s Trust Fund 
and the liability of employers and employees in the financing of the Trust Fund. 
Georgia’s UI tax structure is designed to both maintain solvency of the Trust 
Fund and to minimize the UI tax burden on the states’ over 200,000 employers. 
The experience rating principle used to compute Georgia’s UI tax rates 
promotes allocative efficiency by imposing a price on each employer that reflects the 
social costs of the unemployment generated by the employer. 
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The biggest disadvantage associated with the experience rating principle is 
the prospect of promoting bankruptcy since it requires higher tax payments from 
employers at a time when they can least afford them.   
Georgia’s current Trust Fund is underfunded for two of the four solvency 
measures examined in addition to the reserve ratio standard. However, Georgia’s 
Trust Fund has not approached insolvency during the historical period examined.  
The current Trust Fund structure yields a reasonably stable reserve ratio over 
the extended period of time (35 years), with the balance remaining above the lower 
bound of 1 percent throughout the historical period until the year 2000.  
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I. Introduction 
This report explores several aspects of Georgia’s Unemployment Insurance 
(UI) Trust Fund, including the structure and the solvency of the Trust Fund. The main 
focus of this report is on the appropriate target level for the Trust Fund balance for 
the state of Georgia. This report is divided into six sections. Section II discusses the 
institutional background of the UI Trust Fund, Section III analyzes the structure of 
the Trust Fund while Section IV discusses the performance of Georgia’s Trust Fund 
during previous business cycles. Section V looks at the UI payroll tax rate cuts and 
Section VI concludes. 
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II. Institutional Background 
The UI program was created over 70 years ago and is designed to assist the 
short-term unemployed blue-collar worker by providing funds with which to 
purchase necessities. It lessens the fear of joblessness, while allowing the out-of-work 
individual an opportunity to make a deliberate search for employment reflective of 
skills and prior earning power. Stated differently, the unemployment compensation 
program helps people bridge the gap between jobs. Employers benefit in that 
unemployment insurance helps to sustain a labor force involuntarily laid off for a 
temporary period. Unemployment compensation also helps to slow the downward 
spiral of business activity at the onset of a downturn in the economy.  
The unemployment compensation program in Georgia is administered by the 
Georgia Department of Labor1 (GDOL), Division of Unemployment Insurance, in 
accordance with the provisions of the Official Code of Georgia (O.C.G.A.) Title 34, 
Chapter 8, Sections 1 through 280 also referred to as the Employment Security Law 
of Georgia. The UI Division is responsible for processing unemployment insurance 
claims and appeals; determining employer tax rates and liability; and, for processing 
employers' quarterly reports and tax payments (GDOL, 2005).  
 
1. Purpose of the Trust Fund 
The federal-state system of UI in the United States was established by the 
provisions of the Social Security Act of 1935 to primarily provide partial wage 
replacement for involuntarily unemployed workers. The original UI provisions aimed 
to partially reduce lost income for involuntarily unemployed workers, to reduce the 
dispersal of skilled workers when employers make temporary layoffs, to help 
maintain aggregate purchasing power during economic downturns, and to prevent the 
breakdown of general labor standards during such periods (O’Leary, 2000).  
Due to the uneven distribution of the risk of unemployment, a market for UI 
would not form naturally in the private sector, since workers with a lower risk of 
becoming temporarily unemployed would form their own pool in order to pay lower 
                                                          
1 The Georgia Department of Labor is an affiliate of the U.S. Department of Labor.  
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insurance premiums. Consequently, if UI was voluntary, workers facing a higher risk 
of temporary unemployment, especially in volatile industries like manufacturing and 
construction, would face prohibitively high premiums. To ensure coverage of both 
high and relatively low-risk employees, the federal and state governments partially 
subsidize the premiums of high-risk workers through a payroll tax collected from 
employers.  
 
2. Financing the UI Trust Fund 
Who Pays into the Fund: Role of State versus Federal Government 
UI in Georgia is financed entirely by payroll taxes levied (statutorily) on 
employers. Employees in Georgia do not contribute to the Trust Fund unlike in the 
states of Alaska, New Jersey and Pennsylvania which collect employee contributions 
as well. Unemployment taxes have both a federal and state component. The federal 
component is nominally 6.2 percent of the first $7,000 of the wages of covered 
employees.2 However, the federal government grants a credit to employers against all 
but 0.8 percentage points of the tax, provided that they pay their state taxes in a 
timely manner and the state’s unemployment compensation program adheres to 
federal guidelines (Tannenwald and O’Leary, 1997). Thus, since Georgia’s 
unemployment compensation program has been approved by the federal government, 
the federal tax is, in effect, 0.8 percent of the first $7,000 of wages, or an equivalent 
of $56 per covered worker each year (Tannenwald and O’Leary, 1997).  
The federal government uses the proceeds from this tax to pay for 
administration of the program at both the federal and state levels, assume partial 
responsibility for the cost of extended benefits, and maintain a federal unemployment 
Trust Fund which a state may borrow from should it exhaust its own Trust Fund. 
Thus, federal government UI taxes are typically not used to pay benefits. Federal 
loans come at a cost to employers as additional federal UI taxes are imposed on 
employers whose states have borrowed from the federal UI Trust Fund. Federal rules 
                                                          
2 The GDOL defines total covered wages as the all wages paid to an employee during his or her 
employment by a contributory employer which were covered under the Employment Security 
Law. 
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dictate that interest payments on federal loans can only be financed by UI surtaxes or 
general revenues and not paid out of Trust Fund balances. 
The taxable wage base for the state of Georgia is the first $8,500 of earnings 
for each employee each year, paid by all liable employers. Wages over $8,500 are 
considered non-taxable for the state of Georgia. Tax rates are based on the 
“experience rating principle” with newly liable employers3, usually employers with 
less than three year’s employment history, being assigned a beginning rate of 2.70 
percent. The minimum and maximum UI tax rates are set by the legislature and vary 
from year to year (GDOL, 2005). The minimum and maximum rates for 2005 were 
0.03 percent and 6.48 percent, respectively. The maximum UI tax rate for 2006 is 
6.21 percent while the minimum rate is unchanged at 0.03 percent. 
Revenues from the state UI taxes are deposited in the UI Trust Fund. The UI 
Trust Fund is used exclusively to finance the regular benefit payments which 
comprise the biggest proportion of total UI costs. The state’s UI system is essentially 
self-financed by its employers, especially since any federal loans to the state must 
eventually be repaid with interest.   
 
Determining UI Tax Rates 
As with other states, Georgia’s UI tax structure is based on the experience 
rating principle. This principle considers the history of an employer’s UI benefits 
paid to former workers, growth of an employer's payroll and the overall 
unemployment conditions for the state. Specifically, this principle requires that an 
employer’s tax rate vary positively with its propensity to lay off workers, and thus 
each employer is subject to a different rate. The UI tax rate also reflects the extent to 
which the employer’s former employees have drawn UI benefits. Lower UI rates are 
earned by employers whose unemployment experience costs are less, and higher rates 
are assigned to employers whose experience indicates greater costs. 
                                                          
3 A liable employer refers to an employing unit that is subject to the Employment Security Law. 
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Georgia’s UI tax rates are determined using the “reserve ratio” approach. 
Under this approach, the GDOL keeps track of each firm’s cumulative tax payments 
to the state Trust Fund since the firm’s inception, and the cumulative benefits paid to 
the firm’s laid off workers. For a given computation date, usually three years ending 
shortly before the beginning of the taxable year, the GDOL determines the firm’s 
“total tax reserve”—difference between its cumulative contributions and benefit 
charges. The “total tax reserve” is then divided by the average annual payroll, to yield 
the percent applied. The resulting percentage is then applied to base rate tables 
provided in the Employment Security Law. The computed rate applies to taxable 
wages paid during the calendar year immediately following the computation date.  
To illustrate the effect of the experience rating principle on UI tax rates, let us 
consider two firms: Tann Inc. and Wolt Inc. both of which have been in existence for 
8 years. Assume that both firms have a 3-year taxable payroll of $750 million and an 
average annual payroll of $250 million during the “computational” period. During its 
existence, Tann Inc. has paid $50 million in UI taxes and due to large and frequent 
layoffs of its employees, $100 million has been charged to its UI account. Wolt Inc. 
on the other hand has experienced better fortunes, paying $30 million in UI taxes 
with only $10 million in benefits charged to its account. This implies that Tann Inc. 
has a total tax reserve of -$50 million ($50 million - $100 million) while Wolt Inc. 
has a total tax reserve of $20 million ($30 million - $10 million). Given this 
information, Tann Inc. and Wolt Inc. have a reserve ratio or percent applied of -20 
percent (-$50/$250) and 8 percent ($20/$250), respectively. These reserve ratios 
indicate that Tann Inc. would be subject to a higher UI tax rate compared to Wolt Inc. 
since the latter has a better experience rating than the former. 
The experience rating principle implies that the employer’s UI tax rate should 
vary with the employer’s account, since changes in an employer’s experience history 
lead to an assignment of a new rate. This therefore suggests that an employer can be 
assigned a different UI tax rate each computation period. 
The experience rating principle divides employers into separate risk pools, 
with firms whose employees face a higher risk of incurring involuntary 
unemployment being subject to a higher tax rate. Such a rate structure is intended to 
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promote allocative efficiency by imposing a price on each employer that reflects the 
social costs of the unemployment that the employer generates. Tannenwald and 
O’Leary (1997) argue that the experience rating principle has the potential 
disadvantage of promoting bankruptcy during recessions since it requires higher tax 
payments from firms when they can least afford them.  
 
3. UI Benefits 
According to the GDOL, UI provides unemployment benefits to eligible 
workers who are unemployed through no fault of their own and who are either 
looking for another job, have definite recall to their jobs within 6 weeks of the last 
day worked, or are in approved training. Eligibility for benefits is determined based 
on past wages, reason for job separation, and availability and job search 
requirements.4 
The weekly benefit amount (WBA) of benefits a claimant may receive is the 
whole dollar amount computed by dividing the two highest base period quarters by 
46.5 Alternatively, the highest base period quarter is divided by 23 to establish the 
WBA up to the allowed maximum set by the legislature. The established WBA is 
based on the individual's earnings and may range from a legislatively established 
minimum amount to a maximum amount. The number of weeks of entitlement ranges 
from a minimum of nine weeks to a maximum of 26 weeks. The total maximum 
benefits to which a claimant is entitled during the benefit year (365 days forward 
from the date the claim is filed) is one-fourth of the total base period wages or 26 
times the weekly benefit amount, whichever is less (GDOL, 2005). The extended 
benefit program provides up to 13 weeks of additional benefits or “extended benefits” 
to workers who have exhausted their regular UI benefits in times of high 
unemployment.  
The state of Georgia is reimbursed by the federal government for 50 percent 
of all but the first week of extended benefits. Therefore, there is a charge of 100 
percent to Georgia employers for the first week of these benefits. Governmental 
                                                          
4 See the GDOL (2005) for details on eligibility requirements. 
5 The base period is the first four of the last five completed calendar quarters at the time of filing. 
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agencies on the other hand are charged 100 percent of all weeks paid with extended 
benefits (GDOL, 2005).  
 
4. Georgia’s Trust Fund Size and UI Tax Rates 
The Employment Security Law requires that the UI Trust Fund be maintained 
at a reasonably adequate level.  The “Statewide Reserve Ratio” (SRR) compares 
Georgia's Trust Fund balance to the state's total covered wages and is used as a 
measurement tool to gauge the adequacy of the state’s Trust Fund. Conventionally, a 
SRR greater or equal to one, indicates a moderately solvent UI Trust Fund. 
Computation of the SRR and other measures of Trust Fund adequacy are explored in 
Section III below.  
The reserve ratio approach used to compute UI tax rates in Georgia 
symbolizes the concept of “precautionary” balances, where each firm has an account 
that builds up a surplus of contributions over benefit charges during periods of 
economic expansion. This surplus is then drawn down during downturns and/ or 
recessions. Following a surge in benefit payouts, a firm’s tax liability rises gradually, 
but remains at a higher level for a substantial period of time and then falls steadily in 
response to improving economic conditions.6 This implies that everything else equal, 
Georgia’s UI tax system is less procyclical compared to UI tax systems based on the 
“benefit ratio” approach.7  
In the computation of annual tax rates, the status of an employer's account-
total tax contributions relative to benefit charges-affects the assignment of a new rate. 
An increase in taxable payroll may cause an increase in the tax rate even though no 
claims have been paid out. Employers with positive balances (tax collections exceed 
benefit charges) are assigned lower rates compared to employers with deficit balances 
(benefit charges exceed tax collections).  
                                                          
6 Tax rates respond gradually because experience ratings are based on cumulative contributions 
relative to benefits, implying that the “weight” of each firm’s prior history creates inertia in 
experience ratings with respect to changes in the incidence of layoffs (Tannenwald and O’Leary, 
1997). 
7 The benefit ratio method is similar to a “pay as you go” approach in which payments for benefit 
charges are made with a lag. A surge in benefits is paid for relatively rapidly, followed by a steep 
fall in payments once the benefit charges have been “paid off” (Tannenwald and O’Leary, 1997).  
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Georgia like other states constrains the range of employer UI tax rates. An 
employer’s tax rate stops rising at some point regardless of how much its experience 
rating has worsened and stops falling irrespective of how much the experience rating 
has improved. The minimum and maximum rates assignable for each type of 
employer account in Georgia are set by the legislature and vary from year to year.8 
 
                                                          
8 Many employers are given the option to make a voluntary contribution to lower their tax rate for 
the year. Tax accounts are reviewed each year to determine employers eligible for this option. 
Employers are not eligible for a voluntary contribution if they (1) have the lowest possible tax 
rate, (2) have not filed all Quarterly Tax and Wage Reports, or (3) because of insufficient 
experience history, they are not otherwise eligible for a rate computation  (GDOL, 2005). 
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III. Structure of Georgia’s Trust Fund 
This section evaluates the financial status of Georgia’s UI Trust Fund using 
three widely used standards of Trust Fund adequacy. Before analyzing the solvency 
of Georgia’s UI Trust Fund, we briefly examine the history of the UI Trust Fund 
balances.  
 
1. History of Trust Fund Balance 
Overall, the Trust Fund balance has grown steadily over the past 30 years 
(1970-1999), with only minor drawdown cycles during the periods 1974-1976, 1981-
1982, and 1990-1992. The onset of the new millennium saw a marked drawdown in 
Georgia’s Trust Fund reserves which lasted for four years starting in 2000 through 
2003. The duration and percentage decrease of the early 2000 drawdown cycle far 
exceeds any other drawdown cycle in the 35 year history considered here. The 
drawdown during the period 2000-2004, is among other things, considered to be a 
result of a 1999 moratorium by the state’s legislature providing for the temporary 
suspension of employer contributions to the Trust Fund.9 Figure 1 below shows the 
trend of Trust Fund balances over the period 1970-2004.  
                                                          
9 See Section V for details on Georgia’s UI tax cuts. 
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FIGURE 1: TRENDS IN TRUST FUND BALANCES (1970-2004) 
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2. Surcharges and Rate Reductions 
To ensure solvency of the Trust Fund while minimizing the UI payroll tax 
burden on the state’s employers, Georgia’s UI Trust Fund structure provides for 
surcharges on covered employers when the reserve ratio falls below 1 percent and 
rate reductions when the reserve ratio gains by over 2.44 percent. Figure 2 below 
shows that the rate reduction provision would only apply prior to 1975 when the 
reserve ratio exceeded the 2.44 percent mark and after 2002 when it fell short of the 1 
percent threshold.   
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FIGURE 2. RESERVE RATIO, SURCHARGES AND RATE REDUCTIONS 
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3. Solvency Measures 
The adequacy of the unemployment insurance (UI) Trust Fund across the 
nation has been the subject of much debate in recent years. Most attention has been 
directed toward what constitutes an adequate amount of Trust Fund reserves and 
whether there is a single most consistent measure of solvency that can be applied to 
UI. In addition to the reserve ratio standard which is a ratio of Trust Fund balances to 
total wages as mentioned earlier, there are two other measures used to assess UI Trust 
Fund solvency: 
● Average High Cost Multiple, Trust Funds are compared to recent 
benefit history; 
 
● High Cost Multiple, Trust Funds compared to long term benefit 
history. 
 
Average High Cost Multiple 
The Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (ACUC) 
recommends the “average high cost” standard for Trust Fund solvency. According to 
this guideline, a state should have enough reserves to finance at least 12 months of 
benefits paid out at the average of its three highest “cost rates” over the previous 20 
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years. The cost rate is the statewide ratio of benefits paid out of total wages of 
unemployment insurance eligible employees in any calendar year. According to this 
standard, adequacy requires that a state’s average high cost multiple (AHCM) should 
equal at least 100 percent. (Tannenwald, O’Leary, and Huang, 1999). 
 
[1] AHCM = 100*((Trust Fund balances as a percentage of total wages in 
covered employment)/ (the average high cost rate)). 
 
The average high cost rate is the average of the three highest calendar year 
benefit cost rates in the last 20 years. Benefit cost rates are benefits paid (excluding 
reimbursement benefits) as a percent of total wages in taxable employment. For 
comparison purposes, we also compute the AHCM over the past 35 years.  
The U.S. Labor Department has endorsed an AHCM of 150 as a solvency 
guideline.  In effect, the standard requires Trust Fund reserves sufficient to finance 18 
months of benefits paid out at the average of the three highest cost rates recorded 
during the past 20 years. (Tannenwald and O’Leary, 1997). Table 1 reveals that the 
state of Georgia does not meet this remarkably stringent solvency requirement. 
 
High Cost Multiple 
The High Cost Multiple (HCM) goes back further in time to compare reserves 
to benefit outlays. In this case, the denominator of [1] will be the highest cost rate 
rather than the average of the three highest cost rates in a state’s benefit history. 
Stated differently, the HCM measure computes the Trust Fund reserves sufficient to 
finance 12 months of benefits paid out at the highest cost rate recorded during the 
previous 20 years. We also include a measure (Second Highest Cost Multiple or 
2HCM) that calculates adequate Trust Fund reserves to finance 12 months of benefits 
paid out at the second highest cost rate recorded during the previous 20 years. The 
findings are presented in Table 1 below. Like in the AHCM case, the U.S. DOL has 
endorsed an HCM and 2HCM of 150 as a solvency guideline. The ACUC on the 
other hand contends that a multiple of at least 100 for both the HCM and 2HCM is 
sufficient. 
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TABLE 1. MEASURES OF SOLVENCY: ALTERNATIVE STANDARDS 
 --------------------------Sufficient Reserves to Finance--------------------------- 
  
12 Months of 
Benefits/ 
Highest Cost 
Rate in 20 
years (HCM) 
 
12 Months of 
Benefits/2nd 
Highest Cost 
Rate in 20 
years (2HCM) 
12 Months of 
Benefits/Avg. of 
3 Highest Cost 
Rates in 20 
years (AHCM 
over 20 years) 
12 Months of 
Benefits/Avg. of 
3 Highest Cost 
Rates in 35 
years (AHCM 
over 35 years) 
Highest Cost Multiple 73 118 119 92 
Current Reserves 
(2004) 
$874,339,726 $874,339,726 $874,339,726 $874,339,726 
Adequate Reserves 
(12 months) 
$1,197,725,652 $740,965,869 $734,739,266 $950,369,267 
Adequate Reserves 
(12 months) 
$1,796,588,478 $1,111,448,804 $1,102,108,899 $1,425,553,901 
 
Table 1 reveals that using the U.S. Labor Department’s most preferred 
solvency measure (column 4), Georgia has sufficient Trust Fund reserves 
($874,339,726) to finance 14 months of benefits paid out at the average of the three 
highest cost rates recorded during the last 20 years. Therefore, the adequate amount 
of Trust Fund reserves needed to finance 12 months of benefits paid out at the 
average of the three highest cost rates recorded during the most recent 20 years is 
$734,739,266. Further, the sufficient amount of reserves to fund 18 months of 
benefits paid out at a similar average cost rate is $1,102,108,899. 
The more stringent measure of solvency (column 2 of Table 1) shows that 
Georgia requires $1,197,725,652 in Trust Fund reserves. This is the amount of Trust 
Fund reserves that is sufficient to finance 12 months of benefits paid out at highest 
cost rate recorded during the past 20 years. 
Table 1 therefore indicates that Georgia has a moderately healthy Trust Fund 
reserve as two of the solvency measures (columns 3 and 4) indicate that the state has 
more than the required amount of Trust Fund reserves to finance at least 12 months of 
benefits, but falls short of the U.S. DOL’s recommended standards. The solvency 
standard adopted by a given state depends in part on the state’s previous economic 
history. For instance, a state may adopt a more stringent solvency standard (see 
columns 2 and 5 in Table 1) if it was severely affected by a past recession, which led 
to a marked drawdown in the state’s Trust Fund balance. A more stringent solvency 
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standard will in such a case be adopted with the goal of rebuilding the Trust Fund 
balance and to ensure solvency if the state ever experienced such a severe downturn. 
 
Reserve Ratio 
Another indicator of Trust Fund solvency is the ratio of Trust Fund balances 
to total wages, also known as the reserve ratio. It is expressed as a percentage. This is 
the highest possible threshold of solvency and in effect, it assesses Trust Fund 
reserves relative to full wage insurance. The rationale for this measure of Trust Fund 
solvency is that covered salaries and wages serve as a proxy for the size of a state’s 
economy and roughly account for economic growth and increased wages and salaries. 
By the end of 2004, Georgia’s reserve ratio was 0.6, indicating that the state’s 
Trust Fund reserves could replace 0.6 percent of all wages. Though there is no 
consensus among UI solvency experts regarding an acceptable reserve ratio standard, 
most feel that a pre-recession reserve ratio of at least 2.0 is ideal (National 
Employment Law Project Publications, 1999). 
Figure 3 below compares the trend of Trust Fund balances to the reserve ratio 
over the period 1970-2004. As seen from Figure 3, the reserve ratio has been very 
stable since the late 1970s through 2000. 
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FIGURE 3: TRENDS IN TRUST FUND BALANCES AND RESERVE RATIO (1970-2004) 
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To summarize, our analysis shows that as of 2004, the Trust Fund is under-
funded for two of the four solvency measures (HCM and AHCM computed over 35 
years, see Table 1) examined in addition to the reserve ratio standard. The Trust Fund 
is adequately funded according to the other two less stringent measures: 2HCM and 
AHCM computed over 20 years (See Table 1). The current Trust Fund structure 
yields a reasonably stable reserve ratio over the extended period of time (35 years), 
with the balance remaining above the lower bound of 1 percent throughout the 
historical period until the year 2000. Further, the fund has not approached insolvency 
during the historical period examined.  
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IV. Trust Fund and the Business Cycle 
1. Trust Fund Performance over the Business Cycle 
We examine the performance of the Trust Fund over four cycles during the 
period 1974-2000: 1974-1981, 1981-1990, 1990-1999, and 1999-2004. Figure 4 
shows the drawdown and build-up of the Trust Fund over these cycles. For each 
cycle, we compare the level of the Trust Fund balance in any given year to the level 
of the Trust Fund balance in the succeeding year. This ratio is always 100 percent in 
year one because the focus of this particular comparison is to measure fluctuations in 
the Trust Fund balance over the duration of the cycle relative to the onset of the 
cycle. Higher Trust Fund balances in upcoming years result in an upward trend or 
build-up while lower Trust Fund balances in subsequent years lead to a downward 
trend or drawdown. Figure 4 indicates that during the period examined, the shortest 
drawdown lasted only one year and was experienced during the 1974-1981 cycle 
while the longest drawdown lasted four years and occurred during the 1999-2004 
cycle. Further, the longest build-up in the level of Trust Fund balances was 
experienced during 1990-1999 cycle and lasted eight years. The build-up in all cycles 
lasted over four years except during the 1999-2004 business cycle, a feature that can 
be attributed to fact that we have data only through 2004, and thus the 1999-2004 
cycle is not yet complete. 
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FIGURE 4. TRENDS IN TRUST FUND BALANCES: 1974-2004 
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Table 2 shows the duration from peak to trough of the business cycle and the 
resulting percentage decline in the Trust Fund balance. The longest peak-trough 
duration was four years and was experienced during the 1999-2004 cycle. The 
resulting percentage decline during this cycle was 63.7 percent and was also the 
highest percentage decline in all of the four cycles considered. Table 2 also shows the 
duration of the build up from trough to peak together with the resulting increase in 
Trust Fund balance compared to the previous peak. The longest build-up lasted eight 
years and occurred during the 1990-1999 cycle. The percent change for trough to 
peak in Table 2 measures the percent change over the previous peak and therefore it 
measures the extent to which the fund is fully replenished before the next drawdown 
cycle begins. The 1981-1990 cycle had the highest trough-peak percentage gain in 
Trust Fund balances at 116.4 percent followed by the 1990-1999 cycle at 83.2 
percent. 
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TABLE 2. PERFORMANCE STATISTICS 
 ---------------Peak to Trough------------ ---------------Trough to Peak-------------- 
 
 
 
Cycle 
 
 
 
Duration 
 
 
 
%Change 
 
Reserve 
Ratio at 
Peak 
 
 
 
Duration 
%Change 
vs. 
Previous 
Peak 
 
Reserve 
Ratio at 
New Peak 
1974-1981 2 Years -51.2% 3.8% 5 Years 8.7% 1.7% 
1981-1990 2 Years -22.8% 1.7% 7 Years 116.4% 1.7% 
1990-1999 1 Year -10.2% 1.7% 8 Years 83.2% 1.6% 
1999-2004 4 Years 63.7% 1.6% NA NA NA 
       
 
2. Stress Testing of Alternative Measures of Solvency 
This section evaluates each of the solvency standards over the four cycles 
discussed earlier. Specifically, we examine whether the Trust Fund balance becomes 
negative at the end of the cycle, which would indicate insolvency, and whether the 
end of cycle peak equals or even exceeds the standard against which it is being 
compared. We assume that the balance at the initial peak is the target balance based 
on the standard and actual wage base. We then examine the draw downs and build-up 
based on actual dollar values of the fund balance for that cycle.  
Tables 3-6 indicate that for all four solvency standards used, the end of cycle 
peak Trust Fund balance becomes negative during the 1999-2004 cycle. Further, end 
of cycle peak balance only exceeds any given standard during the 1990-1999 cycle. 
This suggests that the Trust Fund experienced a substantial build-up during the 
economic expansion of the 1990’s while the economic slowdown that characterized 
the onset of the new millennium led to a marked drawdown of the Trust Fund 
balance. 
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V. Unemployment Insurance Tax Cuts 
 
Georgia has embraced the fact that the best way to ensure the financial health 
of the UI Trust Fund is to constantly create jobs. Job growth simultaneously increases 
payments into the fund and lessens flows out of the fund. This realization has led to 
unemployment compensation and UI tax rate reforms.  
According to the National Employment Law Project Publications (NELP) 
(1999) the state of Georgia reduced the UI tax rate by 6.25 percent in 1994, costing 
the Trust Fund an estimated $45 million in UI tax revenues. A bill passed by the 
state’s legislature in 1998 cut the UI payroll tax by another $112 million, which 
provided for tax cuts of $92.2 and 30.6 million in 1999 and 2000, respectively. This 
was followed by a moratorium that provided for a temporary suspension of employer 
payments. In February of 1999, the governor announced plans to slash UI payroll 
taxes by $1 billion over the next four years. This four-year moratorium, ending at the 
start of 2004, saw many employers pay very little into the Trust Fund due to its 
previous hefty balance.  
In light of the tremendous gains in the state’s economy coupled with reduced 
pay-outs during the most recent recovery, the state announced a $50 million UI tax 
cut toward the close of 2004. This tax cut which translates into a 7.3 percent tax break 
for employers is not expected to have a substantial effect on the financial health of 
the UI Trust Fund in 2005. The UI trust Fund is projected to collect well over $650 
million in UI taxes in spite of the 2005 UI payroll tax cut. Unlike the previous 1999 
moratorium where almost all of the states’ over 200,000 employers benefited from 
temporary suspension of employer payments, UI tax savings will this time round 
hinge on the employers’ track record in layoffs and workforce force stability.10  
However, UI pundits at the NELP argue that in spite of being one of the 10 
best-financed, Georgia’s UI Trust Fund at its current level of almost $875 million, 
would still have a tough time financing future payouts especially if the state suffered 
a fairly quick downturn in 2006 or 2007. Experts draw a close comparison with New 
                                                          
10 Atlanta Journal-Constitution  (2004). 
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York, Texas, Illinois and other states whose UI Trust Funds are now insolvent 
following UI tax cuts during the celebrated economic times of the 1990’s.  
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VI. Conclusions 
 
This report discusses various aspects of Georgia’s Trust Fund, pointing out 
several similarities and differences with UI tax systems in other states. Major 
similarities include the determination of UI tax rates using the experience rating 
principle while differences encompass the financial health of Georgia’s Trust Fund 
and liability of employers and employees in the financing of the Trust Fund. Further, 
Georgia’s UI tax structure is designed to both maintain solvency of the Trust Fund 
and to minimize the UI tax burden on the states’ over 200,000 employers. The 
experience rating principle used to compute Georgia’s UI tax rates promotes 
allocative efficiency by imposing a price on each employer that reflects the social 
costs of the unemployment generated by the employer. The disadvantage of this 
principle is the possibility of promoting bankruptcy since it requires higher tax 
payments from firms at a time when they can least afford them.   
Our analysis on the solvency of Georgia’s Trust Fund shows that the current 
Trust Fund is underfunded for two of the four solvency measures examined in 
addition to the reserve ratio standard. The current Trust Fund structure yields a 
reasonably stable reserve ratio over the extended period of time (35 years), with the 
balance remaining above the lower bound of 1 percent throughout the historical 
period until the year 2000. Further, the fund has not approached insolvency during 
the historical period examined.  
Treating the alternative Trust Fund solvency measures as target ratios for the 
Trust Fund, the fund would have come extremely close to insolvency or even become 
insolvent at points during the historical period. Analysis of the business cycles 
reveals that the build-up cycle does not consistently reach the target ratio for these 
measures. Our analysis shows that Georgia’s Trust Fund appears to have been 
severely affected by factors including the slowdown of the U.S. economy in 2001, 
past UI tax rate reductions, and the temporary suspension of employer UI tax 
payments into the Trust fund. Therefore, a cushion in addition to the target ratio is 
needed to manage the risk of insolvency.  
 
Analysis of Georgia’s Unemployment Insurance 
Trust Fund Reserves 
 
 
 24 
References 
 
Atlanta Journal-Constitution (2004).  “State Gives Firms $50 Million Break on 
Jobless Tax.” (http:/www.ajc.com/news/content/business/1204/02fund.html.) 
 
Georgia Department of Labor (GDOL) (2005).  The Employer’s Handbook.  DOL-
224 (R-1/05). 
 
O’ Leary, Christopher J. (2000). “U.S. Unemployment Insurance: Progress and 
Prospects.” Employment Research 7(2).  www.upjohninst.org/publications/ 
newsletter/cjo_700.pdf 
 
National Employment Law Project Publications (1999). “Unemployment Insurance 
Tax Cuts on the Rise: A Summary of Recent State Experiences.” July. 
 
Tannewald, Robert, and Christopher J. O’Leary (1997). “Unemployment Insurance 
Reform in New England: Options and Considerations.” New England 
Economic Review May/June: 3-22. 
 
Tannenwald, Robert, Christopher J. O’Leary, and Wei-Jang Huang (1999). “New 
Ways of State Unemployment Insurance.” New England Economic Review 
March/April: 15-40. 
 
 
Analysis of Georgia’s Unemployment Insurance 
Trust Fund Reserves 
 
 
 25
About the Author 
Edward Sennoga is a research associate in the Fiscal Research Center and is 
currently finishing his Ph.D. in Economics at Georgia State University, writing on tax 
evasion and tax structure.  He has received numerous academic and teaching awards 
in the Andrew Young School.  Mr. Sennoga is from Uganda, and earned his B.A. in 
Economics from Makerere University in Kampala. 
 
 
About The Fiscal Research Center 
 
 The Fiscal Research Center provides nonpartisan research, technical 
assistance, and education in the evaluation and design of state and local fiscal and 
economic policy, including both tax and expenditure issues.  The Center’s mission is 
to promote development of sound public policy and public understanding of issues of 
concern to state and local governments. 
 The Fiscal Research Center (FRC) was established in 1995 in order to 
provide a stronger research foundation for setting fiscal policy for state and local 
governments and for better-informed decision making.  The FRC, one of several 
prominent policy research centers and academic departments housed in the School of 
Policy Studies, has a full-time staff and affiliated faculty from throughout Georgia 
State University and elsewhere who lead the research efforts in many organized 
projects. 
 The FRC maintains a position of neutrality on public policy issues in order to 
safeguard the academic freedom of authors.  Thus, interpretations or conclusions in 
FRC publications should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). 
 
Analysis of Georgia’s Unemployment Insurance 
Trust Fund Reserves 
 
 
 26 
FISCAL RESEARCH CENTER STAFF 
David L. Sjoquist, Director and Professor of Economics 
Peter Bluestone, Research Associate 
Margo Doers, Administrative Coordinator 
Jaiwan M. Harris, Business Manager 
Kenneth J. Heaghney, State Fiscal Economist 
John W. Matthews, Senior Research Associate 
Lakshmi Pandey, Senior Research Associate 
Edward Sennoga, Research Associate 
William J. Smith, Senior Research Associate 
Dorie Taylor, Assistant Director 
Arthur D. Turner, Microcomputer Software Technical Specialist 
Sally Wallace, Associate Director and Associate Professor of Economics 
Laura A. Wheeler, Senior Research Associate 
Tumika Williams, Staff Assistant 
 
ASSOCIATED GSU FACULTY 
James Alm, Chair and Professor of Economics 
Roy W. Bahl, Dean and Professor of Economics 
Carolyn Bourdeaux, Assistant Professor of Public Administration and Urban Studies 
Robert Eger, Assistant Professor of Public Administration and Urban Studies 
Martin F. Grace, Professor of Risk Management and Insurance 
Shiferaw Gurmu, Associate Professor of Economics 
Douglas Krupka, Assistant Professor of Economics 
Gregory B. Lewis, Professor of Public Administration and Urban Studies 
Jorge L. Martinez-Vazquez, Professor of Economics 
Theodore H. Poister, Professor of Public Administration and Urban Studies 
David P. Richardson, Professor of Risk Management and Insurance 
Michael J. Rushton, Associate Professor of Public Administration and Urban Studies 
Bruce A. Seaman, Associate Professor of Economics 
Geoffrey K. Turnbull, Professor of Economics 
Mary Beth Walker, Associate Professor of Economics 
Katherine G. Willoughby, Professor of Public Administration and Urban Studies 
 
PRINCIPAL ASSOCIATES 
David Boldt, State University of West Georgia  
Gary Cornia, Brigham Young University 
Kelly D. Edmiston, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 
Alan Essig, Georgia Budget and Policy Institute 
Dagney G. Faulk, Indiana University Southeast 
Catherine Freeman, U.S. Department of Education 
Richard R. Hawkins, University of West Florida 
Julie Hotchkiss, Atlanta Federal Reserve Bank 
Mary Mathewes Kassis, State University of West Georgia 
Julia E. Melkers, University of Illinois-Chicago 
Jack Morton, Morton Consulting Group 
Ross H. Rubenstein, Syracuse University 
Benjamin P. Scafidi, Georgia College and State University 
Jeanie J. Thomas, Consultant 
Kathleen Thomas, University of Mississippi 
Thomas L. Weyandt, Atlanta Regional Commission 
 
 
GRADUATE RESEARCH ASSISTANTS 
Kailou Wang  
Qian Xue 
 
Analysis of Georgia’s Unemployment Insurance 
Trust Fund Reserves 
 
 
 27
RECENT PUBLICATIONS 
(All publications listed are available at http://frc.aysps.gsu.edu or call the Fiscal Research Center at 
404/651-2782, or fax us at 404/651-2737.) 
 
Analysis of Georgia’s Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund Reserves (Edward 
Sennoga).  This report analyses several aspects of Georgia’s Unemployment 
Insurance Trust Fund, including the structure and the appropriate target level for the 
Trust Fund balance for the state of Georgia.  FRC Report/Brief 123 (March 2006) 
 
The Demographics of Georgia IV:  Hispanic Immigration Economic Policy Issues 
(Felix Rioja, Neven Valev, and Amanda Wilsker).  This report analyzes the 
economic policy issues in education, health care, the labor market, financial services 
and the fiscal impact arising from the large increase in Hispanic immigration in 
Georgia.  FRC Report/Brief 122 (March 2006) 
 
Georgia’s Taxes Per Capita and Per $1,000 of Income:  Comparisons and Trends 
(Peter Bluestone).  This report analyzes the trends in Georgia’s taxes per capita and 
taxes per $1,000 of personal income for the period 1981 – 2002.  FRC Report/Brief 
121 (February 2006) 
 
The Demographics of Georgia I:  Population in the State of Georgia: Trends and 
Projections to 2030 (Glenwood Ross).  This report explores trends in Georgia 
population dynamics and projects population growth to the year 2030. FRC 
Report/Brief 120 (February 2006) 
 
An Examination of Georgia’s Premium Tax. (Martin F. Grace). This brief 
analyzes the effects of changing the structure the insurance premium tax on tax 
revenues in Georgia.  FRC Brief 119 (February 2006) 
 
The Fair Tax and Its Effect on Georgia. (Laura Wheeler, Sally Wallace and 
Lakshmi Pandey). This brief analyzes the impacts of a national retail sales tax on 
Georgians.  FRC Brief 118 (December 2005) 
 
A Tax Limitation for Georgia? (David L. Sjoquist). This brief examines the need 
for a tax limitation in Georgia and the issues of design of tax or expenditure 
limitations.  FRC Brief 117 (December 2005) 
 
Georgia’s Aging Population:  What to Expect and How to Cope (Glenn Landers, 
Clare S. Richie, David Sjoquist, Sally Wallace, and Angelino Viceisza).  This 
report analyzes the impacts of Georgia’s aging population on state finances.  FRC 
Report/Brief 116 (December 2005) 
 
Potential Effect of Eliminating the State Corporate Income Tax on State Economic 
Activity (Laura Wheeler).  This report analyzes the effects to state employment and 
investment of eliminating the state corporate income tax.  FRC Report/Brief 115 
(October 2005) 
 
Analysis of Georgia’s Unemployment Insurance 
Trust Fund Reserves 
 
 
 28 
Financing an Increased State Role in Funding K-12 Education:  An Analysis of 
Issues and Options (Peter Bluestone, John Matthews, David L. Sjoquist, William 
J. Smith, Sally Wallace, and Laura Wheeler).  This report presents an analysis of 
replacing school property tax with alternative state revenue sources  FRC Report 114 
(October 2005) 
 
Neighborhood Dynamics and Price Effects of Superfund Site Clean-Up (Douglas 
Noonan, Douglas Krupka and Brett Baden).  This report uses census data to 
analyze the price effects of superfund site clean-up, inclusive of both direct price 
effects and indirect effects through clean-up's effect on neighborhood demographic 
transitions and reinvestment in the housing stock.  FRC Report/Brief 113 (October 
2005) 
 
Perfect Competition, Spatial Competition, and Tax Incidence in the Retail Gasoline 
Market (James Alm, Edward Sennoga and Mark Skidmore).  This report uses 
monthly gas price data for all 50 U.S. states over the period 1984-1999 to examine 
the incidence of state gasoline excise taxes.  FRC Report/Brief 112 (September 2005) 
 
The Research and Development Tax Credit for Georgia (Laura Wheeler).  This 
report describes the existing Georgia State R&D tax credit and explores the 
implications of modifying its current design.  FRC Report/Brief 111 (September 
2005) 
 
Cooperation on Competition:  The Multistate Tax Commission and State Corporate 
Tax Uniformity (W. Bartley Hildreth, Matthew N. Murray and David L. 
Sjoquist).  This report explores how interstate uniformity of state corporate income 
taxes has varied over time, the role played by the MTC, and how likely it is that 
uniformity will be achieved.  FRC Report 110 (August 2005) 
 
Tax Revenue Volatility and a State-Wide Education Sales Tax (John Matthews). 
This brief examines issues of revenue source stability raised by proposals to shift K-
12 education costs from local property taxes to a state-wide sales tax.  FRC Brief 109 
(June 2005) 
 
Accountability for Economic Development Incentives in Georgia (Jeanie Thomas).  
This report identifies Georgia's major economic development incentives and other 
forms of public finance support and calls for a comprehensive evaluation of public 
expenditures in this area.  FRC Report/Brief 108 (July 2005) 
 
Teen Childbearing and Public Assistance in Georgia (Lakshmi Pandey, Erdal 
Tekin and Sally Wallace).  This brief examines the link between teen births and 
welfare.  FRC Brief 107 (May 2005) 
 
 
(All publications listed are available at http://frc.aysps.gsu.edu or call the Fiscal Research Center 
at 404/651-2782, or fax us at 404/651-2737.) 
